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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MENTAL HEALTH - THE MENTALLY
HANDICAPPED Do NOT CONSTITUTE A "QUASI-SUSPECT CLASS" FOR
PURPOSES OF EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Cleburne Living Centers, Inc., (CLC) sought to lease a
building in the city of Cleburne, Texas to operate a group home for
thirteen mentally retarded adults and CLC staff.1 The city
informed CLC that because mentally handicapped people would
live in the home, a special use permit was required pursuant to a
Cleburne zoning ordinance. 2 CLC applied for the permit, but the
1. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3252 (1985). CLC
sought to operate a group home as a private, intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded. Id.
at 3252 n.2.
2. Id. at 3252-53. See CLEBURNE, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Zoning Ordinance S 16 (June 8,
1965), quoted in Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3253 n.3. CLC sought to operate the group home in an
"apartment house district." 105 S. Ct. at 3252 n.3. A Cleburne zoning ordinance allowed the
following uses in an apartment house district:
1. Any use permitted in District R-2 ["Two-Family Dwelling District"].
2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
3. Boarding and lodging houses.
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
5. Apartment hotels.
6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or aged, other than
for the insane orfeeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts.
7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is carried on as a
business.
8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal institutions.
9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses....
CLEBURNE, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Zoning Ordinance S 8 (June 8, 1965), quoted in Cleburne, 105
S. Ct. at 3252 n.3 (emphasis added).
Section 16 of the zoning ordinance required a special use permit for "hospitals for the insane or
feeble-minded" operated anywhere in the city. Id. 5 16, quoted in Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3253 n. 3.
Permits were limited to one year in duration, and applicants were required to obtain signatures from
owners of property within two hundred feet of the special use property. Id.
The city determined that the proposed group home would be a "hospital for the feeble-
minded," and was therefore subject to the permit requirement. 105 S. Ct. at 3252-53.
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city council denied the application after a public hearing on the
issue. 3 CLC then filed suit in Federal District Court against the city
and several officials, alleging that the ordinance violated the United
States Constitution by discriminating against retarded citizens.4
The trial court applied a "minimum rationality" standard of
review 5 and determined that the ordinance was constitutional. 6 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,
ruling that mentally handicapped persons are members of a
"quasi-suspect" class, 7 and that the ordinance was invalid both on
its face8 and as applied to CLC. 9 The United States Supreme Court
held that the mentally handicapped are not a quasi-suspect class, 10
but that the Cleburne ordinance, as applied to CLC, nevertheless
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution. 1 City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne
Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
The equal protection clause requires that the government
treat all similarly situated persons equally. 12 A statute that
3. 105 S. Ct. at 3253. Section 16 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance provided that special use
permits may be issued by "the governing body, after public hearing, and after recommendation of
the Planning Commission." CLEBURNE, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Zoning Ordinance S 8 (June 8,
1965), quoted in Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3252 n.3. For a discussion of the reasons advanced by the City
of Cleburne as justification for denying a special use permit to CLC, see infra notes 6, 50-62, and
accompanying text.
4. 105 S. Ct. at 3253. CLC alleged that the Cleburne zoning ordinance violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1. The equal
protection clause provides that "[njo State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Id.
5. See 105 S. Ct. at 3253. Under the "minimum rationality" standard, legislation is upheld if it
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303 (1976). For further discussion of the minimum rationality standard of review, see infra note
15. For a discussion of equal protection standards of review in general, see infra notes 15-17.
6. 105 S. Ct. at 3253. The trial court found that the Cleburne ordinance was rationally related
to the city's legitimate interests in the legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, the safety and
fears of neighboring residents, and the number of persons to be housed in the home. Id.
7. Cleburne Living Center v. City ofCleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd,
105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). Suspect or quasi-suspect classes are granted greaterjudicial protection under
the equal protection clause than are non-suspect classes. See G, GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 621-
22 (1 1th ed. 1985). For further discussion concerning suspect and quasi-suspect classes, see infra
notes 16-17.
8. Cleburne Living Center v. City ofCleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd,
105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that "[tlhe standardless
requirement of a special use permit for all group homes for the mentally retarded is both vastly
overbroad and vastly underinclusive." Id. The court noted that the city failed to show that retarded
persons presented special problems that would justify subjecting them to restrictions that were not
imposed on other groups. Id. at 200-01.
9. Id. at 202. The court noted that even if the ordinance were constitutional on its face, the
application of the ordinance was based on prejudice and unjustified distinctions between the
mentally handicapped and other groups. See id. at 201-02.
10. 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
11. See id. at 3259.
12. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982). See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, 5 1. For the text of the equal protection clause, see supra note 4. Whether persons are
"similarly situated" depends upon the objectives of the statute. P/yer, 457 U.S. at 216. Thus, the
equal protection clause "does not reject the government's ability to classify persons or 'draw lines' in
the creation and application of laws, but it does guarantee that those classifications will not be based
upon impermissible criteria or arbitrarily used to burden a group of individuals." J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 586 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK).
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explicitly allows differential treatment of a group of people may be
challenged under the equal protection clause as being facially
invalid. 13 In addition, a statute that appears neutral on its face is
constitutionally invalid if it is applied in a discriminatory manner. 14
Courts apply one of three levels of scrutiny to determine whether a
statute is constitutionally acceptable: rational basis review,' 5 strict
scrutiny, 16 or intermediate level review. 17 The level of scrutiny
13. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (a state statute that explicitly
barred blacks from juries was invalid on its face).
14. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Yick Wo, a city ordinance required
persons to obtain a license prior to operating a laundry. Id. at 357. All but one of the non-Chinese
applicants, but none of the 200 Chinese applicants, were granted licenses. Id. at 359. The United
States Supreme Court concluded that the statute was applied with the intention of racial
discrimination. Id. at 374. The Court stated: "Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand,. the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."
Id. at 373-74.
To avoid unnecessarily broad constitutional judgements, the court has not addressed the
facial validity of a statute that is unconstitutional as applied. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 2794, 2801 (1985). This distinction between constitutionality as applied and facial
constitionality had, however, been recognized prior to Cleburne only in cases involving infringements
upon the freedom of speech. See infra notes 58-59.
15. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (classification based
on whether vendor operated from a pushcart need only be "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest"). Rational basis analysis - the least scrutinizing level of judicial review - is considered
appropriate for most legislation, particularly social and economic regulation. See, e.g., United States
R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175-76 (1980) (retirement fund distribution scheme.
subject to minimum level of judicial scrutiny). Legislation subject to rational basis review is
presumed to be valid, and is upheld if it is conceivable that the challenged classification promotes a
legitimate governmental interest. See id. at 179 (Court sought only "plausible reasons for Congress'
action"); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (economic and social regulation does not
violate the equal protection clause merely because the classifications created are imperfect and result
in some inequity).
Under traditional rational basis analysis, courts routinely uphold challenged legislation. See
Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). One commentator has labeled rational basis scrutiny as "minimal
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Id.
16. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying "the most rigid
scrutiny" to racial classifications). Strict judicial scrutiny is applied to legislation that impinges upon
a "fundamental right" - an interest that is protected explicitly or implicitly by the Constitution. See
NOWAK, supra note 12, at 594-95 n.21. The Supreme Court has articulated several fundamental
rights thus far. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper
v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (voting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 353, 541 (1942) (marriage and procreation).
In addition, legislation that disadvantages a "suspect class" of persons is reviewed under strict
scrutiny. See Korernatsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (racial classifications are "immediately suspect"). The
Supreme Court has recently indicated the general disabilities, originally recognized only in racial
minorities, characteristic of a "suspect class" as follows: (1) a history of purposeful discrimination
against the class; (2) political powerlessness, such that the class needs protection from the
majoritarian political process; and (3) a general denial of legal benefits on the basis of stereotypes not
truly indicative of class members' abilities. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam). The immutability of the characteristic on which the classification
is based is also an important consideration in determining whether the classification is "suspect." See
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court has
recognized only three suspect classes: race (Korernatsu, 323 U.S. at 216); national origin (Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948)); and alienage (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72
(1971)).
The strict scrutiny test requires the government to show a compelling purpose for the law - one
so great as to justify a limitation of the fundamental constitutional value of equality. See NOWAK,
supra note 12, at 591-92. The Court will then make an independent determination of whether the law
is necessary to achieve its purpose. See id. at 592. Legislation subject to strict scrutiny is rarely found
constitutional, and the test has been labeled 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, supra note
15, at 8.
17. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1976) (gender-based
legislation must be "substantially related to an important governmental objective"). Intermediate
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applied depends primarily on the classification established by the
challenged statute. 18
Prior to Cleburne, the United States Supreme Court had not
addressed the level of scrutiny applicable to classifications based on
mental retardation. 9 The Court had addressed, however, the
possible application of strict scrutiny beyond the three traditionally
recognized "suspect classes" of race, national origin, and alienage
in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.20 In Murgia the Court
stated that the aged, unlike members of recognized suspect classes,
have not been "subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities." 2 '
The Court suggested that strict judicial scrutiny of legislation is
inappropriate when the classifying characteristic involved
adequately reflects an individual's abilities. 22 Moreover, the Court
noted that two characteristics which are present in previously
recognized suspect classes - a history of purposeful discrimination
and a need for protection from the majoritarian political process -
were not present in the aged classification. 23 Thus, the Court
applied the rational basis test to legislative classifications based on
age. 24
Unlike the Supreme Court, several lower federal courts have
addressed the question of which standard of review is applicable to.
level scrutiny is applied when legislation affects a "quasi-suspect" class - a class of persons who
share some disabilities with members of the suspect classes, but whose classifying characteristics may
often be legitimate targets of legislation. Compare Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99 (classifications based on
sex often reflect outdated misconceptions concerning the proper roles of females and males, and do
not reflect actual abilities of individuals) with Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320-21 (1977) (per
curiam) (sex-based classification may be a legitimate remedy for past discrimination against
women).
Intermediate level, or "heightened," scrutiny requires the government to show that the
classification is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest. Craig,
429 U.S. at 197. Unlike the strict scrutiny and rational basis tests in which application of the
standard virtually determines the outcome, use of the intermediate level of scrutiny has led to
varying results. Compare Califano, 430 U.S. at 321 (upholding classification based on sex) with Craig,
429 U.S. at 210 (striking down sex-based classification).
The Supreme Court has extended intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on sex (Craig,
429 U.S. at 197), legitimacy of birth (Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978)), and status as the child
ofan illegal alien (Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982)).
18. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982). For a discussion
of how the classification created by a statute determines the standard of review to be applied, see
supra notes 15-17.
19. See Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir.
1984), af'd, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (finding no controlling precedent for determining the proper
standard of review for classifications based on mental retardation).
20. 427 U.S. 307 (1976). The plaintiff in Murgia challenged Massachusetts' mandatory
retirement age for state troopers. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 308
(1976). See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, S 26 (3)(a) (West 1966). The Court noted that age,
although not a perfect indicator of fitness, does reflect a general diminution in physical abilities. 427
U.S. at 315-16. Thus, the Court found that Massachusetts had a legitimate concern with the age of
its employees, and upheld the imposition of a mandatory retirement age. Id. at 314-15.
21. 427 U.S. at 313.
22. See id. at 313-14.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 314. For a discussion of rational basis analysis, see supra note 15.
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classifications based on mental retardation.25 In Association for
Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson,2 6 the Federal District Court
for the District of North Dakota found that recent reforms in the
legal rights of mentally retarded persons indicated that the mentally
handicapped are not politically powerless. 27 The court also
determined that the differential treatment afforded mentally
retarded persons is often related to the actual disabilities they
possess. 28 Thus the court held that mentally retarded individuals do
not constitute a suspect class.2 9 However, the court noted that
mentally handicapped people still suffer some discrimination
unrelated to their actual disabilities. 30 Intermediate level scrutiny,
rather than rational basis review, was therefore applied. 31
InJ. W. v. City of Tacoma32 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit considered the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance
similar to the ordinance at issue in Cleburne. 33 The court determined
25. See, e.g., Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 163 n.35 (3rd Cir. 1980) (en banc) (indicating
in dicta that the mentally handicapped may be a discreet and insular minority deserving heightened
scrutiny due to their minimal impact on society and the political process), vacated on other grounds, 457
U.S. 307 (1982); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 959 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (dictum)
(discrimination against mentally retarded persons should be subject to scrutiny heightened beyond
the minimal rationality test); Colin v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375, 1388 (D.R.I. 1982) (the mentally
handicapped are not a suspect class), aff'd on other grounds, 715 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1983); Doe v. Koger,
480 F. Supp. 225, 230 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (dictim) (seriously doubting that the mentally handicapped
constitute a suspect class), aff'd, 710 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1983). For a general discussion supporting
heightened scrutiny for classifications based on mental and physical handicap, see Burgdorf &
Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class"
Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855, 902-08 (1975).
26. 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
27. Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 490 (1982),
aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). Courts generally consider political powerlessness to be a factor
indicating the need for suspect class status. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313. For a discussion of Murgia
and the factors indicating the need to treat a group as a suspect class, see supra notes 16, 20-24, and
accompanying text.
28. 561 F. Supp. at 490. Discrimination based on stereotypes not reflective of class members'
abilities is one factor that is characteristic of traditionally recognized suspect classes. See Murgia, 427
U.S. at 313. For a discussion of Murgia and the factors indicating the need to treat a group as a
suspect class, see supra notes 16, 20-24, and accompanying text.
29. 561 F. Supp. at 490.
30. Id. The court stated that discrimination against the mentally retarded "has often been a
reflection of the fact that the mentally retarded do have a reduced capacity for personal relations,
economic choice, and physical control," but went on to note that the mentally retarded do suffer
from some discrimination that is not related to actual disabilities. Id.
31. Id. The court explained its decision to apply intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on
mental retardation as follows:
Although this court does not grant "suspect class" status to the plaintiffs, it is acutely
aware, from the evidence received at trial, of the extent to which the mentally retarded
still suffer from some discrimination that is not related to actual disabilities. For this
reason, the court believes that state action concerning retarded persons must be
reviewed under a level of scrutiny higher than the rational basis test. To this end, the
court will adopt the intermediate level of scrutiny applied by the United States
Supreme Court on several occasions.
Id.
32. 720 F.2d 1126(9th Cir. 1983).
33. Compare J.W. v. City of Tacoma, Washington, 720 F.2d 1126, 1127 (9th Cir. 1983) with
Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3252. The Tacoma zoning ordinance at issue in,]. W required a special use
permit for the operation of a group home for newly-released mental patients.J W, 720 F.2d at 1127.
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that the intermediate level of scrutiny was appropriate because the
availability of group homes is an important benefit, and because
the mentally ill are frequently victims of prejudice and unjustified
stereotypes. 34 The Cleburne Court of Appeals citedJ. W. as support
for its holding that zoning restrictions affecting the mentally
handicapped should be subject to intermediate level scrutiny. 35
The Supreme Court in Cleburne determined for several reasons
that rational basis was the appropriate standard of review for
classifications based on mental retardation.3 6 The Court first cited
Murgia for the general rule that heightened scrutiny is inappropriate
if members of a class have a characteristic that reflects their abilities
in an area relevant to a legitimate state interest. 37 The Court noted
that the mentally handicapped have a reduced ability to cope in
everyday life, 38 and that retarded individuals differ greatly from
one another in this respect. 39  These genuine and varying
disabilities were found to be a legitimate concern of the state, and
thus the rule in Murgia was satisfied.4 0  Moreover, because
An identical group home that did not include newly-released mental patients would not require a
permit. Id. The plaintiff brought'an action in federal court challenging the zoning ordinance as an
unlawful discrimination against persons who have suffered from mental illness. Id. at 1127-28.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Cleburne, distinguished the decision inj. W. on the
grounds that "mental retardation is functionally different from mental illness." Cleburne Living
Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191, 198 n. 1l (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct.
3249 (1985).
34. 720 F.2d at 1129. AccordGalioto v. Department of Treasury, 602 F. Supp. 682, 686 (D.N.J.
1985) (former mental patients are a quasi-suspect class). But see Doe v. Colautti, 454 F. Supp. 621,
631 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (mentally ill persons differ from suspect classes in that their condition is not an
immutable one determined at birth and that their condition truly reflects their abilities), aff'd 592
F.2d 704 (3rd Cir. 1979). Seegenerally, Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237,
1258-59 (1974) (mental illness should be considered a suspect classification); Comment, Wyatt v.
Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1282,
1294 n.62 (1973) (the institutionalized mentally ill should be granted suspect class status). The
United States Supreme Court has specifically reserved the issue of whether the mentally ill constitute
a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 231 n. 13 (1981).
35. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191, 199-200 (1984),
aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
36. 105 S. Ct. at 3255-58.
37. See id. at 3255 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)).
For a discussion of Murgia, see supra notes 16, 20-24, and accompanying text.
The Cleburne Court contrasted the mentally handicapped with women, a class accorded
intermediate scrutiny, by noting that gender "generally provides no sensible ground for differential
treatment. '[Wjhat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statutes as intelligence or physical disability
. . . is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society.' " Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(plurality opinion)).
38. Id. at 3256. Mental retardation is defined as "significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
developmental period." Brief for American Association on Mental Deficiency as Amicus Curiae at 3,
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (quoting AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATIONS IN MENTAL RETARDATION 1 (H. Grosman ed.
1983)). Deficits in adaptive behavior are defined as "limitations on general ability to meet the
standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, and social responsibility expected for an
individual's age level and cultural group." Id. at 4 n. 1.
39. See 105 S. Ct. at 3256 & n.9. The Court noted that the mentally retarded are not "cut from
the same pattern: as the testimony in this record indicates, they range from those whose disability is
not immediately evident to those who must be constantly cared for." Id. at 3256.
40. Id. justice Marshall concurred in the result but criticized the Court's reliance on Murgia as
support for its rejection of heightened scrutiny. Id. at 3269 n.19 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
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treatment of retarded persons is a "difficult" and "technical"
matter, the Court stated that the "perhaps ill-informed" judiciary
should defer to the legislature in this area. 41
Second, the Court found that recent legislative action in favor
of the mentally handicapped indicated that lawmakers harbor no
continuing prejudice toward retarded people, and .that the
handicapped have captured the attention of lawmakers and the
public.4 2 According to the Court, applying heightened scrutiny to
laws concerning the mentally handicapped may be detrimental to
retarded persons by chilling such legislative response. 43 Thus the
Court concluded that the mentally handicapped are no longer
politically powerless, 44 and that they do not need heightened
The Court in Murgia rejected strict scrutiny of age-based classifications, but the intermediate
standard of review had not yet been acknowledged by the Court. Id. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 210-11 (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing intermediate level review), reh'g denied, 429 U.S.
1124 (1976). Thus Justice Marshall reasoned that Murgia could support a rejection of strict scrutiny
in Cleburne, but it could not support rejection of intermediate level review. See 105 S. Ct. 3269 n. 19
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part). For a discussion of intermediate review, see supra note 17.
Justice Marshall also criticized the Court's conclusion that the reduced abilities of retarded
persons calls for the rejection of heightened scrutiny in all cases involving the mentally handicapped.
Id. at 3270 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). According to Justice Marshall, "that some retarded
people have reduced capacities in some areas does not justify using retardation as a proxy for reduced
capacity in areas where relevant individual variations in capacity do exist." Id. Because retardation
may be irrelevant in some circumstances, Justice Marshall concluded that classifications based on
retardation should be subjected to heightened scrutiny. Id.
41. 105 S. Ct. at 3256.
42. Id. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 S 504, 29 U.S.C. 5 794 (1982) (prohibiting discrimination
against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals in federally funded programs); Education of the
Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1982) (to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped
children must be educated along with non-handicapped children); 5 C.F.R. S 213.3102(t) (1985)
(exempting mentally retarded individuals from certain competitive Civil Service examinations).
Among various legislative and administrative action cited by the Cleburne Court as favoring the
mentally handicapped, the Court cited the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act as legislation providing mentally retarded persons with the "right to receive 'appropriate
treatment, services, and habilitation' in a setting that is 'least restrictive of[their] personal liberty.' "
105 S. Ct. at 3256 (quoting Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6010(1)-(2) (1982)). This statement, however, appears in contradiction with the Court's ruling in
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). Compare Cleburne, 105 S. Ct.
at 3256 with Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). In Pennhurst the
Supreme Court held that the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act did not
guarantee the right to appropriate treatment in the least restrictive environment. Pennhurst, 451 U.S.
at 18. The Court determined that Congress had neither intended to require the states to provide
funds for such services, nor had it conditioned the receipt of federal funds on state action. Id. at 18,
22. The Court stated that by enacting the provision, Congress had merely expressed a policy of
preferred, not mandatory, state action. Id. at 19-20. See generally Comment, The "Bill of Rights" of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act Did Not Create Substantive Rights for the Mentally
Retarded to Appropriate Treatment in the Least Restrictive Environment, 58 N. D.L. REV. 119 (1982).
43. See 105 S. Ct. at 3257. For examples of the types of legislative actions the Court feared might
be chilled by applying heightened scrutiny to laws concerning the mentally handicapped, see supra
note 42.
The Court stated that legislation intended to benefit retarded persons might include provisions
that appear to disadvantage them. Id. As an example, the Court noted that the Education of the
Handicapped Act requires only an "appropriate" education, not necessarily one equal in all respects
to that of a nonretarded child. Id. See 20 U.S.C. S 1412(2)(B) (1982). The Court reasoned that
subjecting such provisions to increased judicial scrutiny would eliminate the flexibility lawmakers
need to enact legislation for the general benefit of disabled persons. See 105 S. Ct. at 3257.
44. 105 S. Ct. at 3257. In contrast to the Supreme Court's conclusion that mentally
handicapped persons are not politically powerless, the Fifth Circuit in Cleburne noted recent action
favoring the mentally handicapped and stated as follows:
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judicial protection. 45
As a final rationale demonstrating the inapplicability of
heightened scrutiny in Cleburne, the Court stated that mentally
retarded persons constitute a "large and amorphous class." 46 The
Court feared that according quasi-suspect status to such a class
would set a precedent for heightened scrutiny of legislation
affecting a variety of other groups. 47 Thus, the Court determined
that rational basis review was the proper approach to legislative
classifications based on mental retardation. 48
Applying the rational basis test to the Cleburne ordinance, the
Court first rejected reliance upon private prejudice as a basis for the
city's action. 49 Catering to the fears and negative attitudes of
We do not believe, however, that the mentally retarded have suddenly become
politically powerful in Texas. They are still a relatively small bloc, notwithstanding
the existence of organizations like the Johnson County Association of Retarded
Citizens. Moreover, their right to vote was unclear as late as 1982. . . . The
powerlessness of the minority is especially clear in our case, for the Cleburne
Ordinance was passed in 1965, long before the [recent legal action].
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191, 198 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1984),
aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
45. See 105 S. Ct. at 3257. Cf San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(legislation discriminating against politically powerless groups is subject to strict scrutiny). Justice
Marshall criticized the idea that the existence of legislation favoring the handicapped reduced the
need for heightened scrutiny. 105 S. Ct. at 3268-69 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). He indicated
that recent legislation favoring the handicapped resulted from public recognition of the invidiousness
of laws restricting such groups. Id. See supra note 42 (examples of legislation favoring the mentally
handicapped). This recognition, he suggested, should be supported by the courts through increased
scrutiny of restrictive laws. Id. at 3269. Justice Marshall analogized classifications based on mental
retardation to classifications based on sex or race, and noted that these latter classifications became
no less suspect once extensive legislation was enacted on the subject. Id. See Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (Congressional action favoring women's rights
suggests the appropriateness of heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications).
46. 105 S.-Ct. at 3257.
47. See id. at 3257-58. As examples of classes in addition to the mentally handicapped that suffer
from immutable disabilities, political handicaps, and social prejudice, the Court specifically
mentioned the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. Id.
48. See id. at 3258. Several members of the Court disagreed with the idea that cases should be
categorized into three distinct standards of review. Justices Stevens and Burger believed that prior
decisions, rather than illustrating three well-defined standards, actually "reflect a continuum of
judgmental responses to differing classifications." Id. at 3260-61 (Stevens, J., concurring). They
would examine any challenged legislation by determining whether an impartial legislator would
believe the law serves a legitimate purpose, and whether an actual correlation exists between the
classification and its actual or presumed purpose. Id. at 3261 & n.4.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, also criticized the rigid three-tier
approach. Id. at 3265 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Justice Marshall stated that the level of
judicial scrutiny should depend upon two factors: the importance of the interest affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the classification drawn. Id. Justice Marshall noted that the societal
interest in establishing group homes is "substantial," as group homes provide the primary means by
which retarded persons interact in a normal community environment. Id. at 3266 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting in part). He further observed that the mentally handicapped have been victims of a
lengthy history of segregation and discrimination. Id. Justice Marshall therefore concluded that a
heightened degree of scrutiny was appropriate for the Cleburne case. Id. at 3268 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 3259. The Court noted that the Cleburne City Council had insisted on the special use
permit for CLC partly because of negative attitudes of nearby property owners, fears of elderly
neighbors, and the possibility of harrassment from students at a nearby junior high school. Id.
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people living near the proposed group home could not, according to
the Court, justify such invidious discrimination.5 0
The Court then addressed the differential treatment between
mentally handicapped persons and other groups under the
Cleburne ordinance. 51 The ordinance imposed a permit
requirement on homes for the mentally handicapped, but freely
allowed the operation of such other facilities as nursing homes and
fraternity houses. 52 Such a distinction, the Court stated, could be
made only if the mentally handicapped presented unique problems
for the city. 53 The Court found that mentally handicapped persons
presented no unique problems in the following areas of concern
raised by the city: (1) the safety of the residents in light of the fact
that the home was located on a 500-year flood plain; 54 (2) the legal
responsibility for actions by the home's residents; 55 and (3) the
over-crowded conditions, traffic congestion, fire hazards, and
disruption of the neighborhood resulting from housing thirteen
people in the home. 56
50. Id. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1984) (legislation must not give effect to
private biases).
51. 105 S. Ct. at 3258-59.
52. Id. The Court stated as follows:
The constitutional issue is clearly posed. The City does not require a special use
permit in an R-3 zone for apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging
houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels, hospitals,
sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged (other than for the insane or
feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts), private clubs or fraternal orders, and
other specified uses. It does, however, insist on a special permit for the Featherston
home, and it does so, as the District Court found, because it would be a facility for the
mentally retarded. May the city require the permit for this facility when other care and
multiple dwelling facilities are freely permitted?
Id. For the text of the zoning ordinance challenged in Cleburne, see supra note 2.
53. Id. at 3259.
54. See id. At least one council member was concerned that the CLC residents would not be able
to get to or from the home in the event of a flood. Petition for Cert., City of Cleburne, Texas v.
Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 joint app. 28 (1985). The Court addressed this concern by
stating that:
[t]his concern with the possibility of a flood, however, can hardly be based on a
distinction between the Featherston home and, for example, nursing homes, homes for
convalescents or the aged, or sanitariums or hospitals, any of which could be located
on the Featherston site without obtaining a special use permit.
105 S. Ct. at 3259.
55. Id. The Court stated as follows:
[I]f there is no concern about legal responsibility with respect to other uses that would
be permitted in the area, such as boarding and fraternity houses, it is difficult to
believe that the groups of mildly or moderately mentally retarded individuals who
would live at 201 Featherston would present any different or special hazard.
Id.
56. See id. at 3259-60. In addressing the concerns of the city arising from the number of people to
be housed in the home, the Court stated:
It is true that [the mentally retarded] suffer disability not shared by others; but why
this difference warrants a density regulation that others need not observe is not at all
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Because the mentally handicapped presented no unique
problems for the city, the Court concluded that application of the
challenged ordinance to CLC was based on "irrational prejudice
against the mentally retarded." ,57 The Court also stated that when
legislation is invalid as applied to a particular plaintiff, it will not
address the question of whether the legislation is facially invalid.
58
Thus, the Court held the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to
CLC, but did not strike it in its entirety.5 9
Justice Marshall argued that the Court, although purporting
to apply a rational basis review, actually employed intermediate
level scrutiny. 60 In his opinion, " 'second order' rational basis
apparent. At least this record does not clarify how, in this connection, the
characteristics of the intended occupants of the Featherston home rationally justify
denying to those occupants what would be permitted to groups occupying the same
site for different purposes. Those who would live in the Featherston home are the type
of individuals who, with supporting staff, satisfy federal and state standards for group
housing in the community; and there is no dispute that the home would meet the
federal square-footage- per-resident requirement for facilities of this type.
Id. at 3260. See 42 C.F.R. § 442.447 (1985) (federal density requirements for group homes for the
mentally handicapped.)
57. 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
58. Id. at 3258. In order to avoid unnecessarily broad constitutional judgments, the Court has
refused to address the facial validity of a statute that is unconstitutional as applied. See id.; Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985) (obscenity statute invalid only as to the inclusion of
"lust" within the realm of obscenity); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (statute
restricting speech on Supreme Court grounds invalid only as applied to sidewalks); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (statute prohibiting attorney referral invalid as applied to NAACP).
This distinction between facial constitutionality and constitutionality as applied, however, has been
made only in cases involving legislative infringement on the freedom of speech. See 105 S. Ct. at 3274
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part). For Justice Marshall's objection to extending this distinction to
cases involving infringements upon equal protection, see infra note 59.
59. 105 S. Ct. at 3260. Justice Marshall criticized the Court's refusal to strike down the
ordinance in toto. Id. at 3273 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). He stated that the invalidation of a
statute as applied, rather than in toto, had never occurred in an equal protection case before. Id. at
3274 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). See supra note 58. Justice Marshall argued that precedent
requires legislation based on "impermissibly overbroad generalizations," such as the Cleburne
ordinance, to be struck down in its entirety. Id. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974) (maternity leave policy struck down in toto because its application to some employees
would fail to further its purpose). Justice Marshall further stated that even if invalidation as applied
were permissible, the Court provided no guidelines for determining when the Cleburne ordinance
might be validly applied. 105 S. Ct. at 3273 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Thus, the mentally
handicapped citizens of Cleburne are still confronted with an ordinance that is not properly tailored
to serve legitimate governmental interests. Id.
60. 105 S. Ct. at 3264 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Justice Marshall stated that
"Cleburne's ordinance [was] invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort of probing
inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny." Id. According to Justice Marshall, the majority
departed from normal rational basis review in three ways. First, the majority ignored the "one step
at a time" principle of traditional rational basis analysis, which allows legislatures to pass
underinclusive legislation. Id. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (legislatures may
implement their program step by step, adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a
perceived evil). Pursuant to this principle, restrictions on retarded individuals based upon safety
concerns should survive rational basis review despite the fact that groups posing similar concerns are
excluded. See 105 S. Ct. at 3264 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). The majority, however, struck
down the Cleburne ordinance largely because it was an underinclusive means of accomplishing the
city's purported purpose. See id. at 3259-60. For a discussion of the majority's treatment of the
underinclusive nature of the ordinance, see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
Second, Justice Marshall noted that the majority scrutinized the record closely in an attempt to
find factual justifications for the ordinance. Id. at 3264 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Under the
traditional rational basis standard, however, courts will not review the record of a case. Id. See
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (refusing to examine evidence to
determine whether a statute serves its purpose), reh'gdenied, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981).
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review" would be a more appropriate label for the majority's
analysis. 61 Justice Marshall believed that refusal to acknowledge
the use of heightened scrutiny was unfortunate because it gave
lower courts no direction regarding when the more searching
review used in Cleburne should be invoked. 62 He also noted that
labeling the Cleburne analysis as "rational basis" scrutiny might
create a precedent for lower courts to apply a searching review to
legislation traditionally subject to minimal scrutiny. 63 Justice
Marshall therefore concluded that the Cleburne decision might lead
courts to intrude too far into areas of legislative prerogative. 64
In addition to its potential impact upon application of rational
basis review, the Cleburne decision may direct future judicial
treatment of groups similar to the mentally retarded. The Court
indicated that it did not wish to set a precedent for heightened
scrutiny of groups such as "the aged, the disabled, the mentally ill,
and the infirm." 65 In light of this statement, it would appear that
Finally, Justice Marshall argued that the majority deviated from traditional rational basis
review by placing the burden on the lawmakers to justify their action. 105 S. Ct. at 3264-65
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Justice Marshall stated: "in normal circumstances, the burden
is not on the legislature to convince the Court that the lines it has drawn are sensible; legislation is
presumptively constitutional, and a state 'is not required to resort to close distinctions or to maintain
a precise, scientific uniformity with reference' to its goals." Id. at 3265 (quoting Allied Stores of
Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959). See also McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-
26 (1961) (legislation is presumed constitutional, despite the fact that the law results in some
inequity).
61. 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall,J., dissenting in part).
62. Id. Justice Marshall found that the searching review employed by the majority resembled
the standard of review employed in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), and in United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In Zobel the Court closely scrutinized a state
revenue distribution scheme before declaring that it was not rationally related to its purpose. 457
U.S. at 61-63 & nn. 9-10. Similarly, in Moreno the Court claimed to apply rational basis scrutiny but
reviewed the "practical effect" of the legislation involved, and rejected its purported purpose. 413
U.S. at 533-34, 537. Justice Marshall referred to Zobel and Moreno as "intermediate review decisions
masquerading in rational basis language." 105 S. Ct. at 3265 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-3 1, at 1090 n. 10 (1978) (labeling Moreno as an
"intermediate review" case). Similarly, professor Herman Schwartz of American University stated
that the Cleburne decision was "an effort by the Court to disguise the fact that they [were] applying
the test for a quasi-suspect class." See Stewart, A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1985, at 108, 112.
63. 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Justice Marshall was particularly
concerned that courts would apply searching review to economic and commercial legislation -
traditionally areas for minimal scrutiny. Id. For a discussion of the various standards of review
applied in equal protection cases, and of the types of legislation traditionally fitting within each, see
supra notes 15-17.
64. See 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall,J., dissenting in part). Legislatures are given wide latitude
by the courts when drawing legislative classifications along economic and commercial lines because,
as stated by Justice Holmes, "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Thus equality in
these areas has not been constitutionally required. See Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3271 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting in part). At least one commentator has noted, however, that the Cleburn decision may
illustrate an expanding view of the equal protection clause. See Stewart, supra note 62, at 112-14. It is
suggested that future "rational basis" decisions will involve a greater degree of scrutiny than the
traditional, very deferential, standard of review. Id. And, when a court is presented with a class that
is not traditionally accorded intermediate level scrutiny, it may rely on the increased scrutiny of
Cleburne to avoid injustice in that particular case. Id. at 112.
65. See 105 S. Ct. at 3257-58. For discussion of the Court's treatment of classes similar to the
mentally handicapped, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
106 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 62:95
the Court will not grant quasi-suspect status to these groups.
66
The Cleburne decision may have particular impact in North
Dakota due to recent statutes and case law concerning the rights of
mentally handicapped individuals in that state. In 1981 the North
Dakota legislature passed a statute guaranteeing developmentally
disabled persons the right to treatment in the "least restrictive
appropriate setting.' '67 IN Association for Retarded Citizens of North
Dakota v. Olson,68 the Federal District Court for the District of
North Dakota relied partly on that legislation to order the
deinstitutionalization of many residents of the state's two main
facilities for the mentally handicapped. 69 North Dakota is expected
to experience a significant increase in the number of mentally
66. See 9 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW REP. 278 (1985). One commentator has
suggested that the Cleburne Court's refusal to extend heightened scrutiny to mentally retarded
persons "indirectly also included mentally ill, elderly, disabled, and infirm persons." Id.
It is particularly unlikely that heightened scrutiny will be granted for the mentally ill, a group
frequently associated with the mentally retarded. The two groups share disabilities, such as a history
of discrimination. Compare Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191,
198 (mentally retarded persons suffer from historical prejudice) with J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720
F.2d 1126, 1129 (1983) (mentally ill persons suffer from prejudice based on "archaic and stereotypic
notions"). However, three factors indicate that the mentally ill are less likely to receive suspect class
status. First, mental illness raises greater safety concerns than does mental retardation. See Cleburne,
726 F.2d at 198 n. I1. Legislative control of the field is therefore more likely to receive judicial
deference. See id. Second, unlike mental retardation, mental illness is considered reversible. Id. Since
the immutability of a characteristic is considered in determining whether a class is granted suspect
status, the mentally ill are less likely to be granted special judicial solicitude. See id. For a discussion
of the factors indicating the need to treat a group as a suspect class, see supra notes 16, 21-23, and
accompanying text. Finally, "mental illness covers a broader spectrum of disorders and is more
difficult to define than mental retardation." Id. The Cleburne Court refused to extend heightened
scrutiny to mentally retarded persons, in part because it determined that such persons comprise a
"large and amorphous class." See 105 S. Ct. at 3257. The mentally ill appear to be an even more
amorphous class than the mentally retarded. See Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 198 n. 11.
67. See Rights of the Developmentally Disabled Act, ch. 294, 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws 756
(codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-02 (Supp. 1985)). Section 2 of the Act provides as follows:
"All persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and
habilitation for those disabilities. Treatment, services, and habilitation for developmentally disabled
persons shall be provided in the least restrictive appropriate setting." Id. S 2.
Subsection 1(3) of the Act defines "least restrictive appropriate setting" as "that setting which
allows the developmentally disabled person to develop and realize his fullest potential and enhances
the person's ability to cope with his environment without unnecessarily curtailing fundamental
personal liberties." Id. § 1(3) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-01.2-01(3) (Supp. 1985)).
Though Texas has a statute similar to North Dakota's, the Cleburne plaintiffs chose to sue under
the equal protection clause rather than under state law. 105 S. Ct. at 3257 & n.l. See Mentally
Retarded Persons Act of 1977, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300, 5 7 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
Several other states have also indicated a legislative policy favoring the integration of mentally
handicapped persons into the community. See, e.g,, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 393.13(2)(b)(2),
393.13(2)(d)(3), (7) (West Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, 55 390(B)(1), 476 (West Supp.
1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 5604 (Supp. 1985); MD. PuB. HEALTH CODE ANN. §§ 7-
102(4)-(6) (Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. S 83-1, 141(3) (1981).
68. 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). The A.R.C. suit
involved the treatment and care of residents at two of North Dakota's institutions for the mentally
handicapped. Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 475
(D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). The institutions involved were two campuses of
the Grafton State School: one located in Grafton, and the other in Dunseith. Id.
69. Id. at 494-95. The district court determined that the system of care at two North Dakota
institutions for the mentally handicapped was inadequate to meet the needs of the residents. Id. at
478-81. Both institutions were overcrowded, unsafe, and understaffed. Id. In addition,
individualized habilitation plans for the residents were not properly implemented. Id. at 479. The
court ordered that the number of residents be reduced from approximately 1050 to not more than 450
byJuly 1, 1987, and not more than 250 byJuly 1, 1989. Id. at 477, 495.
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handicapped persons living in community-based facilities once the
judicial orders of the A.R.C. suit are carried out.70
Moreover, in 1983 the North Dakota legislature prohibited
restrictive zoning against group homes serving small numbers of
developmentally disabled individuals.71 As a result, North Dakota
cities may not use zoning to prohibit the housing of six or fewer
mentally retarded persons in a single-family residence, nor may
they use zoning to prohibit the housing of eight or fewer residents
in a non-single-family district. 72 Moreover, a city must exercise
great care in drafting restrictions on group homes serving larger
numbers of retarded persons, because the decision in Cleburne may
be read to require that all facilities posing similar concerns be
subjected to similar restrictions. 73
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70. See NORTH DAKOTA STATE COUNCIL ON DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, NORTH DAKOTA STATE
PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES SERVICES UNDER P.L. 95-602 S 4.1.1 (1983). The situation in
North Dakota resembles the national trend toward development of community-based residences. See
Brief for National Conference of Catholic Charities as Amicus Curiae at 9, City of Cleburne, Texas v.
Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). The number of group homes in America has
increased from 611 in 1971-72 to 6302 in 1983. Id.
71. See Residential Zoning for Group Homes Act, ch. 317, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 782 (codified
at N.D. CENT. COOE S 25-16-14(2)). The Act provides as follow:
A licensed group home serving six or fewer developmentally disabled persons shall be
considered a permitted use in a single family or equivalent least density residential
zone, and a licensed group home serving eight or fewer developmentally disabled
persons shall be considered a permitted use in any area zoned for residential use of
greater density than single family use.
Id.
72. Id. For the text of the North Dakota statute affecting zoning of group homes for the mentally
handicapped, see supra note 71.
73. See 105 S. Ct. at 3259-60. For a discussion of the requirement in Cleburne that zoning
ordinances affecting the mentally handicapped must likewise affect other groups raising similar
concerns, see supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.

